

REMARKS

Claims 1-3 and 11-13 have been amended as shown above. The amendments are being made to clarify the invention, and focus more directly on the portions of the invention believed to be of commercial significance. The amendments are fully supported by the specification, claims, and figures as originally filed. No new matter is believed or intended to be involved.

The Office Action rejected claims 1-5, 7-15, and 17-19, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), as being anticipated by U.S. Pat. No. 6,553,413 (hereinafter “Leighton”). Applicants traverse the rejection because numerous elements recited in the pending claims are not taught or suggested in Leighton.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejection of Claim 1

Regarding claim 1, Applicants note that this claim has been modified to include the limitations of “providing secondary content to the end-user wherein the secondary content is associated with a first domain and the modified content is associated with a second domain and wherein encoding the embedded navigation link into a new link comprises masking the embedded navigation link so that the secondary content and the modified content appear to originate from the same domain”, which Applicants assert are not disclosed or suggested in Leighton. Applicants assert that no new matter has been introduced by the amendments to claim 1, and that antecedent basis for those amendments can be found in claims 2 and 3 and paragraph 25 of the application as originally filed.

Applicants note that the limitations which have been added to claim 1 are similar to the limitations previously found in claim 3. While Applicants note that the limitations added to the amended version of claim 1 are not the same as the limitations found in claim 3, Applicants submit that an examination of the sections of Leighton cited in the Office Action as including the

limitations of claim 3 will help highlight certain differences between the limitations added to the present version of claim 1 and the prior art.

Particularly, Applicants note that the Office Action asserted that the limitations of “the secondary content is associated with a first domain and the modified content is associated with a second domain, and wherein encoding the embedded navigation link comprises: changing one of the first domain and the second domain so that the secondary content and the modified content appear to originate from a common domain,” which previously appeared in claim 3 were disclosed by column 2, lines 57-60, and column 8, lines 7-20, of Leighton. Those passages will be addressed below.

With regard to lines 57-60 of column 2 of Leighton, Applicants note that that passage reads as follows: “A further feature of the present invention is the ability to distribute and manage content over a large network without disrupting the Content Provider’s direct relationship with the end user.” Applicants assert that that passage does *not* teach or suggest the limitations of encoding an embedded navigation link by masking the embedded navigation link so that the secondary content and the modified content appear to originate from a common domain for at least the reason that lines 57-60 of column 2 of Leighton do not mention encoding embedded navigation links, nor do they mention a specific type of encoding, one which comprises masking the embedded navigation link so that secondary content and modified content appear to originate from a common domain. Indeed, Applicants note that lines 57-60 of column 2 of Leighton do not mention embedded navigation links, or any another type of links, *at all*. Therefore, Applicants assert that the lines 57-60 column 2 of Leighton do not teach or suggest the limitations which have been added to claim 1.

With regard to lines 7-20 of column 8 of Leighton, Applicants note that that passage reads as follows:

Preferably, the embedded URLs names are hashed into numbers between 0 and 99,999, although this range is not a limitation of the present invention. An embedded URL is then switched to reference the virtual ghost with that number. For example, the following is an embedded URL from the Provider’s site:

<IMG SRC = <http://www.provider.com/TECH/images/space.story.gif>>

If the serial number for the object referred to by this URL is the number 1467, then preferably the URL is rewritten to read:

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<IMG SRC = http:  
//ghost1467.ghosting.akamai.com/www.provider.com/TECH/images/space.story.  
gif>
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Applicants assert that that passage does *not* teach or suggest the limitations of “providing secondary content to the end-user wherein the secondary content is associated with a first domain and the modified content is associated with a second domain and wherein encoding the embedded navigation link into a new link comprises masking the embedded navigation link so that the secondary content and the modified content appear to originate from the same domain”, which currently appear in the last clause of claim 1. Instead, Applicants assert that the above passage teaches encoding embedded URLs so that content appears to come from servers which are *different* from the server hosting the content provider site. In support of this assertion, Applicants draw the Examiner’s attention to lines 41-46 of column 5 of Leighton, which specify that “[a]ccording to the present invention, preferably the markup language base document 28 is served from the Web server (i.e., the Content Provider site) whereas a given number (or perhaps all) of the embedded objects are served *from other servers*” (emphasis added). Applicants further draw the Examiner’s attention to lines 21-23 of column 8 of Leighton, which explain that “[t]he user of serial numbers in this [the manner described in lines 7-20 of column 8] manner distributes the embedded URLs roughly evenly over the 100,000 virtual ghost server names.” In light of those passages, Applicants submit that the encoding of Leighton is very different from the type of encoding recited in claim 1, because claim 1 recites encoding comprising “masking the embedded navigation link so that the secondary content and the modified content appear to originate *from the same domain*” (emphasis added), while Leighton encodes URLs to refer explicitly to content on other servers. Therefore, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) be withdrawn, and that that claim be allowed.

Regarding claims 2-4 Applicants note that each of those claims depends from claim 1, and incorporates each novel limitation of claim 1. Therefore, Applicants assert that, for at least the reasons set forth with respect to claim 1, each of claims 2-4 contains novel limitations not found in Leighton. Thus, Applicants respectfully request that the rejections of claims 2 and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) be withdrawn, and that those claims be allowed.

Applicants note that claims 2 and 3 have been amended. Applicants assert that the amendments to claims 2 and 3 do not introduce new matter, and were made purely to ensure that the limitations of claims 2 and 3 are consistent with the limitations recited in amended claim 1. Applicants assert that antecedent basis for the amendments to claims 2 and 3 can be found in claims 2 and 3 as originally filed.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejection of Claim 5

Regarding claim 5, Applicants note that the preamble of that claim specifies that this claim is directed to “a method for making event information associated with a first frame of a web browser available to a second frame of the web browser, wherein a first content originating from a first domain is associated with the first frame and a second content originating from a second domain is associated with the second frame.” Applicants further note that the Office Action asserted that those limitations were taught in lines 31-49 of column 5 of Leighton, a passage which reads as follows:

As seen in FIG. 2, a typical Web page comprises a markup language (e.g. HTML) master or base document 28, and many embedded objects (e.g., images, audio, video, or the like) 30. Thus, in a typical page, twenty or more embedded images or objects are quite common. Each of these images is an independent object in the Web, retrieved (or validated for change) separately. The common behavior of a Web client, therefore, is to fetch the base HTML document, and then immediately fetch the embedded objects, which are typically (but not always) located on the same server. According to the present invention, preferably the markup language base document 28 is served from the Web server (i.e., the Content Provider site) whereas a given number (or perhaps all) of the embedded objects are served from other servers. As will be seen, preferably a given embedded object is served from a server (other than the Web server itself) that is close to the client machine, that is not overloaded, and that is most likely to already have a current version of the required file.

Applicants assert that this passage does not teach or suggest the limitations of making event information associated with a first frame of a web browser available to a second frame of the web browser for at least the reasons that lines 31-49 of column 5 of Leighton do not even mention frames of a web browser, let alone teaching or suggesting making event information associated with a first frame of a web browser available to the second frame of the web browser. Therefore, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 5 be withdrawn, and that that claim be allowed.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejections of Claims 7-10

Regarding claims 7-10 Applicants note that each of those claims depends from claim 5, and incorporates each novel limitation of claim 5. Therefore, Applicants assert that, for at least the reasons set forth with respect to claim 5, each of claims 7-10 contains novel limitations not found in Leighton. Thus, Applicants respectfully request that the rejections of claims 7-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) be withdrawn, and that those claims be allowed.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejection of Claim 11

Regarding claim 11, Applicants note that claim 11 has been amended in a manner similar to claim 1. Applicants further note that the rejection of claim 11 was not given a separate treatment from the rejection of claim 1 in the subject Office Action. Therefore, Applicants assert that the analysis provided in support of the traversal of the rejection of claim 1 is similarly applicable to claim 11. Consequently, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 11 be withdrawn, and that that claim be allowed.

Applicants assert that no new matter has been introduced by the amendments to claim 11, and that antecedent basis for the amendments to claim 11 can be found in claims 12 and 13 and paragraph 25 of the application as originally filed.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejections of Claims 12-14

Regarding claims 12-14 Applicants note that each of those claims depends from claim 11, and incorporates each novel limitation of claim 11. Therefore, Applicants assert that, for at least the reasons set forth with respect to claim 11, each of claims 12-14 contains novel limitations not

found in Leighton. Thus, Applicants respectfully request that the rejections of claims 12-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) be withdrawn, and that those claims be allowed.

Applicants note that claims 12 and 13 have been amended. Applicants assert that the amendments to claims 12 and 13 do not introduce new matter, and were made purely to ensure that the limitations of claims 12 and 13 are consistent with the limitations recited in amended claim 11. Applicants assert that antecedent basis for the amendment to claims 12 and 13 can be found in claims 12 and 13 as originally filed.

35 U.S.C. §102(e) Rejection of Claim 15

Regarding claim 15, Applicants note that the preamble of that claim recites limitations similar to those recited in the preamble of claim 5. Applicants further note that the rejection of claim 15 was not given a separate treatment from the rejection of claim 5 in the subject Office Action. Therefore, Applicants assert that the analysis provided in support of the traversal of the rejection of claim 5 is similarly applicable to claim 15. Consequently, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 15 be withdrawn, and that that claim be allowed.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejections of Claims 17-19

Regarding claims 17-19 Applicants note that each of those claims depends from claim 15, and incorporates each novel limitation of claim 15. Therefore, Applicants assert that, for at least the reasons set forth with respect to claim 15, each of claims 17-19 contains novel limitations not found in Leighton. Thus, Applicants respectfully request that the rejections of claims 17-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) be withdrawn, and that those claims be allowed.

Since, for at least the reasons discussed above, each of the pending claims in the application recites novel limitations not taught or suggested in the prior art of record, Applicants respectfully request that each rejection be withdrawn and that claims 1-5, 7-15, and 17-19 be allowed in their present form. Applicants submit that the above discussion does not constitute an exhaustive list of the novel limitations found in those claims which are not taught or suggested in the prior art of record. To the extent that Applicants have not addressed certain aspects of the present rejection, please do not construe the same as an admission as to the merits

of the rejections. Indeed, Applicants reserve all rights with respect to arguments not explicitly raised herein.



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CONCLUSION

In light of the arguments made herein, it is respectfully submitted that the claims of the present application meet the requirements of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Accordingly, reconsideration and allowance of these claims are earnestly solicited. Applicants encourage the Examiner to contact their representative, Ria Schalnat at (513) 651-6167 or rschalnat@fbtlaw.com, if any further issues need to be addressed prior to allowance.

The Commissioner for Patents is hereby authorized to charge any deficiency or credit any overpayment of fees to Frost Brown Todd LLC Deposit Account No. 06-2226.

Respectfully submitted,


Daniel Keele Burgin, et al.

By


Ria Farrell Schalnat, Reg. No. 47,058
Attorney for Applicants
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
2200 PNC Center
201 East Fifth Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 651-6167

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SHERRILL G. JONES